May 8, 2017 Reading Time: 3 minutes

In a recent post at FT, Sam Flemming documents growing concerns among some former Fed officials that the Fed “risks political interference and losing its independence if it maintains a large balance sheet in the longer term.” I’ve discussed the increase in the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet before.  More recently, George Selgin has recommended shrinking the balance sheet in a predictable, stable way. I think the Fed should shrink its balance sheet, returning to normal levels. But, today, my task is much narrower than making that case. I merely want to argue that one common argument for why the Fed should not shrink its balance sheet is nonsensical.

As Flemming writes, some economists opposed to shrinking the balance sheet “predict that the balance sheet will need to stay at $3tn or more as commercial banks’ reserves at the Fed remain far above pre-crisis levels.” (emphasis added) In this view, the Fed should not shrink its balance sheet because reserves held at the Fed are too large. As I think you will soon see, that makes absolutely no sense.

When the Fed purchased the assets that are now on its balance sheet, it created digital balances to pay for them. Those digital balances (i.e., reserves) were deposited in the accounts that the sellers (i.e., banks) have at the Fed. For this reason, a graph of the Fed’s balance sheet looks a lot like a graph of the monetary base, which is comprised of currency and reserves held at the Fed. The first shows the value of what has been purchased. The second shows the value of what has been spent to make those purchases.

Typically, when the Fed purchases assets, banks see their reserve ratios—that is, the ratio of reserves to deposits—increase above their desired reserve ratios. To achieve its desired reserve ratio, the bank will increase its lending. When it makes a loan, the lending bank sees its reserves shrink. But where do these reserves go? The borrower gets the loan, spends the funds, and those funds get deposited into some other bank. One bank’s reserves falls and another bank’s reserves increase by the same amount. Now, the second bank has a reserve ratio that is greater than its desired reserve ratio and another iteration of the lend-spend-deposit process begins. The process continues until each bank is satisfied with its reserve ratio.

Note that each bank becomes satisfied with its reserve ratio not because the quantity of reserves has fallen—we’ve just moved those reserves around and around and around again. Rather, it is because the amount of deposits has increased. Indeed, banks cannot shrink the amount of reserves in the system. Where would they go? An individual bank can decrease its own reserves, but only by causing the reserves of some other bank to increase. The quantity of reserves in the system is unchanged.

How, then, can the amount of reserves in the system shrink? Simple: by reversing the process that increased the amount of reserves in the first place. That is, to reduce the amount of reserves in the system, the Fed must shrink its balance sheet. When the Fed sells the assets it holds, banks purchasing those assets from the Fed use reserves to pay for them. Hence, reserves held by banks at the Fed fall as the balance sheet shrinks. Again, we are just looking at two sides of the same transaction.

Hopefully you can now see why the argument described by Flemming is nonsensical. Reserves are greater than they were before the crisis because, beginning in 2008, the Fed created more reserves. It did so in the process of expanding its balance sheet. Reserves will not fall—indeed, cannot fall—until the Fed shrinks its balance sheet.

William J. Luther

William J. Luther

William J. Luther is the Director of AIER’s Sound Money Project and an Associate Professor of Economics at Florida Atlantic University. His research focuses primarily on questions of currency acceptance. He has published articles in leading scholarly journals, including Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Institutional Economics, Public Choice, and Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. His popular writings have appeared in The Economist, Forbes, and U.S. News & World Report. His work has been featured by major media outlets, including NPR, Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, TIME Magazine, National Review, Fox Nation, and VICE News.

Luther earned his M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics at George Mason University and his B.A. in Economics at Capital University. He was an AIER Summer Fellowship Program participant in 2010 and 2011.


Selected Publications

Cash, Crime, and Cryptocurrencies.” Co-authored with Joshua R. Hendrickson. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (Forthcoming).

Central Bank Independence and the Federal Reserve’s New Operating Regime.” Co-authored with Jerry L. Jordan. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (May 2022).

The Federal Reserve’s Response to the COVID-19 Contraction: An Initial Appraisal.” Co-authored with Nicolas Cachanosky, Bryan Cutsinger, Thomas L. Hogan, and Alexander W. Salter. Southern Economic Journal (March 2021).

Is Bitcoin Money? And What That Means.”Co-authored with Peter K. Hazlett. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (August 2020).

Is Bitcoin a Decentralized Payment Mechanism?” Co-authored with Sean Stein Smith. Journal of Institutional Economics (March 2020).

Endogenous Matching and Money with Random Consumption Preferences.” Co-authored with Thomas L. Hogan. B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (June 2019).

Adaptation and Central Banking.” Co-authored with Alexander W. Salter. Public Choice (January 2019).

Getting Off the Ground: The Case of Bitcoin.Journal of Institutional Economics (2019).

Banning Bitcoin.” Co-authored with Joshua R. Hendrickson. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2017).

Bitcoin and the Bailout.” Co-authored with Alexander W. Salter. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (2017).

The Political Economy of Bitcoin.” Co-authored with Joshua R. Hendrickson and Thomas L. Hogan. Economic Inquiry (2016).

Cryptocurrencies, Network Effects, and Switching Costs.Contemporary Economic Policy (2016).

Positively Valued Fiat Money after the Sovereign Disappears: The Case of Somalia.” Co-authored with Lawrence H. White. Review of Behavioral Economics (2016).

The Monetary Mechanism of Stateless Somalia.Public Choice (2015).


Books by William J. Luther

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