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Sit in any time beyond the first month of a typical ECON 101 class and here’s what you’ll be taught: free markets work well, but only under conditions that seldom prevail in reality – a regrettable fact that requires the state to intervene to correct each of the many market failures.
The apparent science on display seems impressive. Curves are drawn on the whiteboard to portray the difference left by free markets between marginal private cost and marginal social cost, between marginal private benefit and marginal social benefit, and the resulting failure of markets to produce socially optimal quantities of outputs and to attach to these outputs socially optimal prices.
Gazing at the curves – or, if the class is especially mathematical, studying the equations – reveals the remedial action that must be taken if society’s welfare is to be optimized. Shift this curve upward, or that one downward – or in the equations modify this coefficient that way or that coefficient this way – and, voila!, society is engineered to optimality with the aid of Scientific Economics.
It all seems to be so objective and free of any taint of ideology. After all, you can see it right there in the graph, in black and white: the marginal private cost of operating the oil refinery is lower than is the marginal social cost of doing so. Only a libertarian ideologue objects to using government to bring marginal private cost into equality with marginal social cost. This libertarian stubbornly elevates his ideology over the public good, for, as the graphs and equations make clear, bringing marginal private costs into equality with marginal social costs yields net social gains. Such engineering is Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky efficient. (It’s impressive to have scientific terms that non-specialists must google.)
It’s a Scientific Fact: Economic Reality is Highly Complex and Often Unobservable
But the reality is that this allegedly scientific case for intervention is not close to being as scientific as it is widely believed to be, especially by economists.
Curves and equations are often very useful tools for helping us to think clearly about reality. But these curves and equations are seldom realities on which researchers can gather actual data. While Jones does incur particular costs by increasing her factory’s output, those costs are not observable to outsiders. Nor are Jones’s costs the same as the costs to Smith who increases his factory’s output by the same amount as does Jones.
Also not observable are the marginal social costs of these factories’ operations. The factory across town might indeed spew pollutants into the air that my neighbors and I breathe. But I challenge anyone to objectively quantify the cost that each of us experiences as a result of a one-percent increase in the factory’s output – then of a two-percent increase – then of a three-percent increase… and then to add these costs together in order to construct a genuinely objective marginal-social-cost schedule.
This challenge cannot be met, although meeting it can be faked. The best that can possibly be done is for a fair-minded researcher to estimate – inevitably using her own subjective evaluations – the costs that I and each of my neighbors individually bear. But how does this researcher know my discount rate – or, rather, know the length of time over which I regard as relevant my exposure to the factory’s emissions? She doesn’t. She can’t possibly know such a thing. And what’s true for her knowledge of my discount rate is true for her knowledge of my evaluation of the precise degree to which the factory’s emissions negatively affect my present well-being.
This researcher – assumed here to stick as closely as possible to the scientific tenets of economics – knows that the preferences, risk tolerances, and discount rates of all individuals affected by the factory’s output differ from each other. Therefore, to scientifically quantify “marginal social costs,” this researcher must get not only such ungettable information about me; she must also get such ungettable information for each of the many individuals who is or who might become affected by the factory’s emissions.
Even ignoring the fact that preferences, risk tolerances, and discount rates can and do change in unpredictable ways, this researcher’s task is undoable.
This impossibility is no small matter. If the researcher overestimates the social costs of the factory’s emissions, she – in league with government officials – imposes her own “social” cost on others. She obliges the factory to reduce output to a level below that which is textbook optimal. The cost to society of this suboptimal level of output might well be as large as, or even larger than, the cost to society of simply leaving the factory free to operate without government attempts to “internalize” on it the social costs of its emissions.
The Scientific Appearance Is a Mirage
At this point the mainstream economist pushes back. He doesn’t deny (How could he?!) that, as a technical matter, getting precise information on marginal social costs is practically impossible. But he insists that such an ideal standard is inappropriate. “We can estimate the divergence between private and social costs closely enough,” the mainstream economist assures us, “and then have government act on those estimates. It’s better than doing nothing.”
While it’s true that the perfect should never be allowed to obstruct the good, there are at least two looming problems with this mainstream-economics approach – problems that warn against trusting it to serve as a reliable guide to government policy.
First, as explained above, there’s no good reason to think that estimates made of social costs by even well-intentioned and sparklingly brilliant government officials will be close-enough to accurate to trust that a government empowered to correct market failures will, on the whole, raise social welfare. The assumption that such officials will typically perform well enough on this front is based on no science; it’s merely an assumption – or, rather, an aspiration.
Second, there’s no good reason to think that government officials in reality face incentives that prompt them to behave as their doppelgängers in textbooks behave. The entire case for using government to correct alleged market failures is built on the belief that self-interested actions of private decision-makers lead them to seek private benefits at the greater expense of the public. But if we assume that people act self-interestedly in their private spheres we must make the same assumption about people’s motivations in public spheres.
Yet despite more than a half-century of warnings from public-choice economists, mainstream economists continue to assume, without much apparent thought, that government officials act in a way that is categorically different from the way these same persons would act were they in the private sector: private persons are assumed to act to promote their own self-interests, while government officials are assumed to act to promote the public interest.
What, however, could be more unscientific than this assumption of dual motivations? It is justified neither by science nor by common sense, but it is crucial to the “scientific” case for government action to correct market failures.
My argument is not that markets are perfect. (They certainly are not.) Nor is my argument that a highly informed and well-meaning deity could not intervene in markets in ways that improve their performance. (Such a splendid creature certainly could.) My argument is that because economists advise government officials rather than deities, the economic case for using government to correct market failures is scientific only in the most superficial sense. Deep down it’s mostly superstition.
Donald J. Boudreaux
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What Arthur Burns Broke, Paul Volcker Fixed
Paul Volcker, who served as chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1979 to 1987, passed away this week at the age of 92. He is widely credited with ushering in a new era in Federal Reserve policy making, where much more attention is given to controlling inflation.
When President Carter appointed Volcker to the Fed, inflation was approaching double digits for the second time in less than a decade. Arthur Burns, who began his tenure as Fed chair in 1970 when inflation was around 4.90 percent, saw inflation rise to 11.51 percent in 1974 Q4, fall to 5.13 percent by 1976 Q4, and begin climbing again thereafter. Inflation rose from around 6.43 to 8.52 percent during G. William Miller’s brief tenure from 1978 to 1979.
Before Volcker, Fed chairs occasionally denied their ability to control inflation. Arthur Burns referred to cost-push inflation (in contrast to the demand-pull inflation caused by faster money growth). “The rules of economics are not working in quite the same way as they used to,” he told Congress in 1971.
There were dissenting views, to be sure. But, for most of the 1970s, they were coming from outside the Fed. Milton Friedman, for example, called Burns out at the December 1971 American Economic Association annual meeting. It was not cost-push inflation, Friedman claimed, but “erratic and destabilizing monetary policy [that] has largely resulted from the acceptance of erroneous economic theories.”
Volker changed that. He acknowledged that the Fed could bring down inflation and then set a course to do just that. Moreover, he did so with great resolve.
Engineering a disinflation is a costly proposition. The central bank must cut the growth rate of money to bring down inflation. However, cutting the growth rate of money also tends to fool producers into thinking there has been a decrease in the relative demand for their products. As a result, they produce fewer goods and services — which often means laying off workers — until they realize the error and adjust their prices down accordingly.
The underproduction problem can be mitigated, to some extent, by credibly announcing the policy in advance. If producers reduce their inflation expectations in line with the policy, they will not be fooled into underproducing.
But that is easier said than done. It is difficult to credibly announce a policy in normal times. Most folks just don’t pay that much attention to — or understand — monetary policy. It is harder still when the central bank has failed to live up to expectations in the past, since even those who do pay attention and understand how monetary policy works are unlikely to believe the Fed will do what it says it will. Hence, even when such measures are called for, cutting the growth rate of money virtually guarantees a recession.
Volcker’s disinflation was no exception. Real GDP growth fell from 6.51 percent in 1979 Q1 to −1.62 percent in 1980 Q3 and remained low through 1983 Q1. Unemployment shot up, from 5.7 percent in 1979 Q2 to 7.7 percent in 1980 Q3; by 1982 Q4, it had reached 10.7 percent. Home builders around the country pleaded for cheap credit by sending two-by-fours to the Marriner Eccles building in D.C.
But Volcker didn’t relent. Inflation came down and stayed down. Indeed, the public came to believe the Fed chair was willing to do whatever it takes to keep inflation low and steady. For every ounce of institutional credibility Burns had lost, Volcker gained a pound.
William J. Luther
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How To Stop the Proliferation of Municipal Bond Issues
It seems rather strange that in a putative democracy a handful of people can legally, if figuratively, reach into the pockets of their neighbors but it happens all the time all across America via municipal bond ballot measures.
The main problem is that the measures “pass” if the majority of those who actually vote are in favor, even if hardly anyone votes. That leads to abuses. We should change the rules and mandate that bond/tax measures must obtain the affirmative approval of over 50 percent of eligible voters, not just those with sufficient incentive, education, and information to vote.
In most areas of our lives, no means no in the sense that no decision defaults to no action. You do not have to actively dislike the advertisement of a stationary bike company to avoid buying one of its products, you can vote “no” by not taking steps to purchase one. Heck, you may even approve of its ad but that does not give the manufacturer the right to drop ship one of its high-tech torture machines to your house and dock your checking account in exchange.
The same goes for physical intimacy. A stranger does not get to lawfully have sex with you because you did not actively swipe left on his or her Tinder profile. And Tinder does not get to establish a Tinder profile for you because you did not explicitly tell it not to. Wells Fargo found that out the hard way (though arguably not hard enough).
The need to obtain explicit consent before taking somebody else’s money (or bodily fluids) is one of the key remaining features of liberty. Without it, life begins to look a lot like slavery or authoritarianism.
But the rules change when the compulsory monopoly we call government makes the rules. The original impetus behind municipal bond measures was the notion that voters need to explicitly accept the tax increases needed to service the bonds. No taxation without representation and all that. When most people voted, and where taxpayers and voters were roughly the same people, bond ballot measures approximated consent. (Why fifty percent is often considered the best threshold is another matter, but I will stipulate it here.)
Statewide bond measures pass about four out of five times. Local ones appear to pass at the same rate, even at the 55 percent threshold established in California. And issuers who fail to gain approval can try again year after year, unlike in corporate proxy resolutions where shareholders are banned from reintroducing resolutions that fail to garner sufficient votes. (The SEC, incidentally, wants to raise those thresholds.)
It is a minor miracle when voters in a town like Monument, Colorado repeatedly put the kibosh on bond measures because the issuer, often a school district, is a concentrated interest with the budget authority to hire consultants who appear to make scientific, objective cases for the “necessity” of the bond. Some of those consultants even conduct market research studies designed to help the issuer use words and arguments most likely to sway voters to click “yes” come election day. Opponents are typically individuals with jobs, families, and lives.
Unlike in the commercial sector, municipal bond issuers do not need to persuade people to their cause, they just need to create enough uncertainty, confusion, or complexity to induce most voters to abstain. While often rational in other contexts, inaction on bond measures often means tax increases because the denominator for passage, regardless of the threshold, is always the number of people who actually voted on the measure rather than the number of registered voters.
Issuers know that and use it to their advantage. A suburb of Sioux Falls, South Dakota recently passed a bond measure 1,085 to 129. That seems like a mandate except 14,700 people were eligible to vote on the measure, which went up for vote on 10 September, a time when most East River South Dakotans are busy settling their kids in school, hanging tree stands, and “gettin’ the beans in” (soybeans of course). In other words, only about 1 in 15 people explicitly approved of the bond measure but the outcome is somehow counted “democratic.” (I don’t live in that town, incidentally, and the measure did not raise taxes but merely did not lower them as a previous bond recently matured.)
Other issuers put their measures up in November but only in odd-numbered years, when voter turnout is even lower than during even-numbered years. Often, public discussion of bond measures is muted because debate might draw out voters, which issuers want to avoid because when turnouts are low measures can be won simply by mobilizing teachers and naive statists.
In response to those obvious problems, some have called for minor reforms, like mandating that all municipal bond measures come up for vote on regular election days in even-numbered years. While that would be an improvement, it misses the main point, that no (action) should always mean no (money or booty). In other words, passage of anything authorizing use of the coercive power of the state to take citizens’ money should require the assent of fifty percent plus of eligible voters, not those who turned out at the polls.
When I proposed this recently at a meeting of the South Dakota chapter of Americans For Prosperity, someone immediately objected “but then no bond measure would ever pass!” “Exactly,” was my response. But of course truly important bond measures would pass, after mature consideration and extensive public debate clarified the issues at stake.
Consider again Monument, which sits on the Front Range betwixt Denver and Colorado Springs. Traditionally, taxes and public spending there were low so it attracted childless singles and older couples. Recently, younger couples with children began moving in because it was relatively cheap and improvements on I-25 promise to reduce commute times to both metropoles. Once ensconced, though, those couples began demanding more and better schools, even though that would mean higher taxes and, ceteris paribus, lower real estate values via what economists call tax capitalization.
I do not live in Monument either and would not presume to tell its residents what type of community they should try to create. But I do believe that a nation that purports to be a democracy should encourage citizens to debate the merits of proposals openly and to have to gain explicit approval for taxes, not a bare majority of a few percent of eligible voters in an inconvenient, secretive ballot. Robust debates could raise awareness of charter schools or maybe signal to parents with young children that they should live elsewhere. Or maybe they would lead to even more financial support for public schools. At the very least, full public discussion might expose the exorbitant fees that many municipalities now pay to consultants and issuers. The point is that to win approval, issuers would have to make a case and not just slide in under the radar.
Yes, voters could turn out to defeat bond measures, as they sometimes do, but the burden of proof should fall on the issuer, especially when public school districts seek funding because they have, with few exceptions, failed to create the type of citizens who vote. NGOs like iCivics are trying to improve civics education but the real problem, especially when it comes to bond and tax issues, is the failure of public schools to teach the basic principles of economics and public finance.
Without that background, most people do not feel comfortable voting on complex bond issues. So, as behavioral finance theory predicts, many abstain and the issuers win.
Robert E. Wright
